Czech non-paper on the institutional structure discussed by the Convention on the Future of Europe

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Created on Monday, 10 February 2003 00:00

The Czech government, represented by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and State Secretary for European Integration, seems to have more specific visions of what the institutional architecture of the enlarged EU should have. The paper was published at the website of the Czech mission to the European Communities and became a matter of discussion among the interested individuals, mainly academics and higher public administration officials, but did not draw any attention of media or public whatsoever. This to a large extent reflects the state of debate on the future of Europe in the Czech society. Especially the issues dealing with institutional technicalities do not seem to attract public focus as they are too distant from everyday life. It is obvious that an impetus for the paper was the Franco-German joint initiative that stirred a vigorous debate at the Convention plenary session of 20 and 21 January. If we look at the non-paper in general, some clear characteristics arise that reflect on the future position of the Czech Republic in the EU. Being a medium-sized country, plus a newcomer, one of the richest candidates that can soon become a net contributor to the EU budget, with quite a tiny but sensitive agricultural sector, with no clear vision what the main ideas in which it can substantially contribute to the integration process should be – all these factors pre-determine the contents of the non-paper.

Let us now explore in more detail the individual parts of the paper that treat the ideas of the respective EU institutions.

European Commission

The Czech government insists on preserving the principle of one commissioner per country, claiming that it is one of the pre-requisites for maintaining the principle of equality among the member states. This is of a special value to Czechs as newcomers and the government is probably aware of the psychological importance of having ”the Czech” in Brussels, despite the fact that he/she does not represent a member state. Further, it asserts that increased number of Commissioners does not necessarily have to lead to less efficiency, given that the portfolios are distributed adequately and the Commission President is given more autonomy in this respect.

As to the investiture of the European Commission, the government is in favour of the election of the President by the European Parliament, however, from the list drawn by the European Council. This reflects the unwillingness to transform the Commission into a purely ”parliamentary cabinet”. Also, the individual commissioners would be selected by the President (presumably in co-operation with European Council), thus basically preserving the status quo.

The non-paper does not mention whether the commissioners could be censured individually. An interesting idea appears in respect to the censure of the Commission – this will become upon the request of European Parliament (under what majority, though?) by the European Council while the European Council could assume its responsibilities before new Commission is appointed. This would seem to disrupt the balance between the institutions and is quite difficult to imagine how this could work, given that the European Council is by far not a permanent body.

Council

The reform of the Council is in many respects the focal point in the Convention itself. Many conventioneers stressed that it is this institution that needs reforming most.The first focal point is obviously the Council (and European Council) presidency. Unlike the vast majority of other smaller member states (and candidates) that insist on maintaining the current system of 6-months rotating presidency, the Czech government seems to be more flexible towards reform. Although the Czechs refuse the idea of permanent European Council President, the non-paper suggests that the current system could be replaced by a team presidency consisting of three member states with 18-months term of office. The team presidency should stick to the balance between smaller and larger as well as poorer and richer member states. Each of the countries would hold presidency over three sectoral Council formations.

The question how the European Council President should be appointed remains unclear – a question that would have to be tackled if the system is to be implemented. Until recently it seemed that the Government would be inclined towards double-hatting the Commission and European Council Presidents. However, neither in the non-paper nor in Mr Kohout´s last interventions there was anything that would suggest that the Government still sticks to this notion.

In other respects, the Czech government views are quite similar to those of many other Convention members, especially on the following points:



The Council sessions should be public when legislating Increased use of the QMV and in those areas where it does not seem feasible at the moment (especially CFSP, ESDP) the use of constructive abstention should be enhanced. However, paper does not mention explicitly whether the Czech government insists on preserving the unanimity in certain areas. Also, it is not clear whether the government is in support of simple double majority or current weighted voting system.

European Parliament

The non-paper mainly deals with the following issues in respect to the EP:

legislative powers: European Parliament should be equal to the Council in legislative matters and the legislative procedure should have one single rule: current co-decision. This implies that the co-operation and consultation procedures should no longer apply when legislating. budgetary powers: the Czech representation insists that the European Parliament has the final say in approving the EU budget. This question is closely linked to the classification of expenditure into mandatory and non-mandatory one. The non-paper pleads for abolishment of this classification thus giving the Parliament full power over the non-mandatory expenditure as well. dissolution of the European Parliament: This particular issue has not been dealt with by the Convention very much so far. The Czech position is that the circumstances under which the EP could be dissolved should be set forth in the Constitutional Treaty. One of the circumstances suggested is that this could happen when the EP repeatedly fails to approve the EU budget or proposal of major importance which won over support by the Council or European Council. The paper does not specify who should have the power to dissolve the Parliament – it can be assumed that it will be the European Council (also advocated by Jan Kohout at the plenary session of 20 January 2003).

European External Representative

The Czech government in principle agrees with the ”double-hatted” EER, acting at the same time as the Commission Vice-President. That would suggest that he/she be more institutionally linked to the Commission. This could be to some extent counterbalanced by having two deputies, one based in the Council, the other in the Commission.

National Parliaments

The Czech proposal resists giving some direct powers to the national parliaments at the EU level. The government is, however, in favour of an early-warning mechanism or ”legislative watchdog”, associated with the application of subsidiarity principle – one half of national parliaments should have the right to ask the Commission to reconsider the legislative proposal if found to breach this principle. The government also does not want to grant automatically the right to lodge an action to the ECJ in this respect but to those Parliaments who have expressed their objection ex ante.The non-paper also strongly resents the idea of having the national parliaments represented in the Congress – either on ad hoc basis, or, as some of the Conventioneers even advocated, in some sort of ”third chamber” (Mr Berger, MEP). The main argument is that this would further undermine the position of the European Parliament and that the national parliaments cannot take over the same tasks as the EP as they are inherently different.

Summary

Generally it can be observed that the government non-paper does not bring any unexpected or new ideas. Most of the issues discussed in it very advocated by the Czech representatives even formerly. Still, it must be said that the paper is very vague in many respects and many questions arising thereof are not clear or cannot be clearly tracked. Given the last discussions in the Convention plenary session and the diversity of views that appeared on the institutional issues, the Czech government will still have to find response to many questions.

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