On 9 June 2026, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, in cooperation with the Think Visegrad Platform, organised a roundtable discussion on European security and defence in Brussels. The debate focused on the evolving security environment in Europe, shaped by Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine, uncertainty regarding future U.S. engagement on the continent, and the wider implications of instability in the Middle East.

As the European Union has significantly stepped up its political, institutional, and financial support for strengthening defence capabilities across the Union in recent years, the paper examines how the V4 countries rely on the levers of the “Europeanisation” of defence—particularly through European funds and frameworks for defence industry development. This aspect gains particular importance in early 2025, when the European Commission will assess national programmes submitted under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative for joint loan financing and decide on the allocation of funding for joint production, research, and development projects across European and partner defence industries, writes Tamás Csiki Varga in his policy paper.

The increasing presence of Chinese connected vehicles on the European market has heightened concerns about cybersecurity risks, particularly regarding their potential use for surveillance, espionage, and cyber operations. Discussions on this issue frequently draw on regulatory approaches and risk assessments developed elsewhere, most notably in the United States. Yet China itself has established one of the most comprehensive regulatory and technical standardisation frameworks for connected vehicles worldwide, writes Paulina Uznaska.

Since the 2015 migration crisis, the Visegrád Four (V4) countries – Poland, Hungary, Czechia, and Slovakia – have adopted strongly securitised migration narratives focused on control, sovereignty, and national identity. Although the region faces only minimal migratory pressure, migration remains a key political issue, often invoked during elections and EU-level negotiations. Yet this narrative of exceptional threat contrasts with the V4’s growing dependence on legal labour migration from third countries, driven by shrinking working-age populations, structural labour shortages, and low wages in key sectors. This paper examines these contradictions and governance gaps, focusing on the tension between securitised political discourse and economic reality.

In 2009, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks argued that public opinion in the European Union had shifted from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus, giving mass politics a stronger role in integration than traditional theories assumed. This sparked debate about the EU’s democratic deficit – a contested concept, but one with real political effects. The gap between citizens and EU institutions has long been visible in European Parliament elections, traditionally seen as “second-order” contests with low turnout and protest voting. However, the 2019 and especially the 2024 elections broke with this pattern: turnout increased, EU issues became more politicised, and party positions more polarised. These shifts suggest that a new transnational cleavage is emerging, marking a turning point for democratic engagement in the EU, writes Csaba Stefán, a Research Fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, in his policy brief.

At the end of November 2024, the European Parliament took a major step by adopting Regulation 2024/3015 banning products made with forced labour on the EU market. The ban, which will enter into force in December 2027, applies to the entire supply chain, with enforcement carried out by national authorities within the Union and by the European Commission in cases outside the EU. Although the measure has a global scope, it faces a number of challenges, particularly in relation to Xinjiang. Forced labour practices in the region have been repeatedly documented and acknowledged by both the International Labour Organization and the United Nations. At the same time, Xinjiang is a key supplier of solar panels, critical raw materials, aluminium, PVC, and cotton, while forced labour there often takes the form of state-organised mobilization outside internment facilities, which makes its detection especially difficult. For this reason, as noted by Jan Švec, Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Prague, enforcing the Regulation will represent one of the most complex challenges for the EU’s trade policy.

Regions and municipalities are not only sources of emissions and areas where the effects of climate change are most visible, but they also serve as important centres for practical climate policy solutions. They are significant implementers of climate measures, particularly in areas such as the use of renewable energy sources, promoting low-carbon transport and introducing adaptation measures to mitigate the effects of climate change. At the same time, they foster investment and innovation in the field of climate action, writes Veronika Oravcová, who, through a series of expert surveys explored the different manifestations of climate policies on the local and regional level.

In this Policy Brief, Marcin Przychodniak analyzes the European Union’s current approach to China in the context of shifting transatlantic relations and growing tensions between the US, the EU, and China. The paper highlights key challenges – from increasing dependency on Chinese raw materials and investment concerns to the need for stronger EU defensive tools against economic coercion. It offers recommendations on how to more effectively protect European interests and security amid rising geopolitical tensions.

In 2019, the green agenda became the flagship of the European Commission’s politics in the face of the European Green Deal. Five years later, the re-elected Ursula von der Leyen would like to keep this agenda as the number one priority for the next political cycle, expressing this goal also in her political guidelines. Meanwhile, major geopolitical events during the last couple of years have led to an unprecedented interest in the security of energy and raw material supplies. These topics started to gain significant attention during the Covid-19 pandemic, then surged further in the following energy crises, and finally peaked after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. Even though the question of energy and supply security has global implications and is being discussed globally, Europe was particularly affected by these aforementioned events, writes Gábor Papp, a Research Fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, in his policy brief.

The first-ever European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) was introduced by the European Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) in March 2024, addressing key challenges in the European defence industry. The strategy aims to increase European defence industrial readiness, encourage Member States to invest in the European defence industry, and reinforce joint European defence procurement and ownership. EU Member States from Central Europe have played a crucial role in supporting Ukraine after the start of the Russian unprovoked and illegal full-scale invasion in February 2022. They also stressed the need to focus the EU's efforts on new initiatives in the field of defence and the defence industry, such as the Act in Support of Ammunition Production or enhancing the European Defence Fund. Writes Timotej Kováčik, Junior Researcher/Analyst focusing on security and defense issues, the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, and energy security at the Slovak Foreign Policy Association.

For over two decades, there have been numerous attempts to define and frame the relations between the EU and NATO. Three joint declarations and significant steps ahead have been taken and yet, there is no clear vision of how these two organisations should work together more efficiently. The commonly accepted idea of cooperation sees “NATO pulling the strings and the EU pushing the funds” in accordance with their respective nature and scope. Is this unbalanced relation the most suitable strategy to counter current geopolitical threats? No. But can this cooperation be upgraded? Possibly, yet this appears to be easier said than done. Providing the EU with a coherent defence policy and a strong industrial base can be a great additional value for NATO and not just in the extreme case of a possible disengagement of the US. Writes Federica Mangiameli, Programme Manager and Policy Fellow for Defence and Security at GLOBSEC, in her Policy Paper.

Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 has brought EU enlargement back as a priority of the EU policy towards the neighbourhood and as a geopolitical tool to ensure peace, stability and prosperity on the entire continent. That resulted in the EU recognising the aspiration of the Associated Trio countries to join the EU and granting membership candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova in 2022 and to Georgia in 2023. In record time, the former two countries also started the EU accession process in June 2024. The accession process of the candidates from the Western Balkans also accelerated. Bosnia and Hercegovina was granted the candidacy status and accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia started in 2022. However, despite the general consensus that enlargement is a geopolitical necessity, the question posed by French President Emmanuel Macron in Bratislava in 2023 – How should we do it? – still remains unanswered. Writes Marta Szpala, a Senior Fellow in the Central European Department at the Center for Eastern Studies.